In the United States today, marriage has long been an institution around which is centered a great deal of debate. One of the most salient contemporary issues concerning marriage is that of same-sex marriage and whether or not it is jurisprudent to incorporate same-sex marriage into the law. In previous times, there were different controversies which surrounded marriage, such as debates over interracial marriage, debates over naturalization through marriage, and debates of gender equality in marriage. The reality of all these controversies is that they stem from the use and application of marriage as a means of social ordering, and the unjust treatment of groups of individuals which arose through the enactment of marriage in this manner. The interracial marriage ban and naturalization through marriage laws were manifestations of threat to the social order felt by those in power; the current same-sex marriage ban is no different than these were. Thus, both of these two sets of laws participate in social construction and enforcement of identity, distinct only in operating upon the different identity characteristics of race and sex. Today’s ban on same-sex marriage is thus ultimately a product of an ideological belief towards the identity characteristic of sex not shared by the entirety of the United States. Since both the ban on same-sex marriage and interracial marriage serves/served to enforce an arbitrary perception of the “proper” identity, they perpetuate injustice of the very kind of which the preamble of the Constitution declares of the US government and its laws to fight against. It is thus by the very nature of their oppressiveness that both the anti-miscegenation laws and same-sex marriage bans have and continue to be called into conflict with the constitution. Indeed, through the analysis and comparison of today’s same-sex marriage ban and historical anti-miscegenation laws, the true nature of marriage in law in general and of the same-sex marriage ban is revealed: marriage in law is a social institution through which the officially sanctioned social order is enforced by public authority, and both the same-sex and interracial marriage bans are unconstitutional as ideologically based enactments of law to this end.
Historically, marriage in the United States has been inextricably linked with legislation enacted by the state; this renders marriage not only an object of abstract emotional import, but also a social and legal institution, which enables the government to order the populace to the ends of those in power. In the United States, the institution of marriage has been one by which two people are able to manifest their personal love and commitment to one another, and a means by which to arrange private life. For by becoming married, a couple can expect a drastic change in lifestyle centered around the codependence of each person on the other, such as shared assets, shared family, shared property, etc. Yet it is not only for emotional and practical purposes isolated to the members and associates of a marriage that two people decide to be married; in fact the equally if not more important feature of marriage for which people decide to marry is the public implications which it entails. In the public sphere, marriage is used to assign different legal and political statuses to individuals involved in matrimony. As such a plethora of legal implications follow the declaration of two people as married; the members of the marriage are subject to new tax benefits, planning benefits, Social Security and insurance policy changes, etc., and the list would continue (“Getting Married: An Overview”). Therefore, the status conferred by the matrimony of two individuals is not simply a product of universally shared abstract values held by people towards the concept of marriage. Instead, marriage itself is instituted and enforced through the state and its law; it becomes a means of social ordering through which public authority is able exercise its grasp on the populace. It is this incorporation of the abstract emotional and ideologically interpreted aspects of marriage into law which has proven damaging to minorities, since the individuals with the power to decide these legislations have not always been representative of the entire population.
Both the notions of interracial marriage and same-sex marriage were/are disruptions of the socially constructed norms of different characteristics of identity, those of race and sex respectively; the same-sex and interracial marriage bans were thus responses to this disruption arising from the hegemonic-subaltern relationship between people of the socially disrupting identity and people of the hegemonic identity. Throughout history and still today, humans have sought to categorize each other by means of perceivable differentiating traits; the acknowledgement of these differentiating traits in and of itself is not harmful, it is the socially generated and perpetuated classification of people by these identity characteristics that generates injustice and oppression (Newman). These are identity characteristics such as gender, sex and race; however as social constructions they are accompanied by a myriad of expectations which are expected to be followed. For example, Nadine Bieghle says of sex, “once assigned a sex, we are expected and raised to conform to society’s definition of the “normal” behaviors and mindsets associated with that sex” (Nadine). Nadine’s description embodies the nature of social expectations well: the expectations are considered “normal,” rendering any divergences from the norm to be perceived in relativistic terms; this reinforces the binary opposition between the hegemonic and subaltern identities, and exacerbates the chaotic effect of any disruptions to the social norm. The notions of interracial marriage and same-sex marriage were/are direct disruptions of the social expectations which accompanied the identity characteristics of race and sex respectively; interracial marriage disrupted the perceived notion that black people were of an inferior race, and same-sex marriage disrupts the perceived notion that marriage can only exist between opposite sexes. As such, the interracial and same-sex marriage bans were responses to a disruption of social norms, exacerbated in effect by the binary-opposition relationship between the two conflicting identities. These notions of race and sex were the hegemony to their counterparts in more aspects than just the ideological; political hegemony was needed to incorporate these notions into law. In both the cases of the anti-miscegenation laws and same-sex marriage ban, those with the political power to enact the bans belonged to the hegemonic group whose interests were being protected. For example, in Pace v. Alabama 1883, a court charged and sentenced an interracial couple for violating the state’s anti-miscegenation statute. The anti-miscegenation laws themselves were all written by white lawmakers, and the Chief Justice Morrison Waite along with all other Associate Justices were white males (Pace v. Alabama). During the case the Alabama Supreme Court said, “[Interracial cohabitation jeopardizes] the highest interests of government and society for it could result in the amalgamation of the two races, producing a mongrel population and a degraded civilization” (Pace v. Alabama). This was the driving ideology of the anti-miscegenation laws and the presiding judges. The ideologically based reasoning of the court is apparent. Similarly, those involved in the enactment and enforcement of the same-sex marriage ban followed the ideology of the hegemon which opposed same-sex marriage. An early case involving the issue of same-sex marriage was denied by a court which believed in anti-gay ideology, and even referenced the Bible as a religious text in its opinion. In Singer v. Hara, gay activists John Singer and Paul Barwick sued local marriage licenser Lloyd Hara for refusing to issue them a license. The court denied their claim, saying that marriage laws are “founded upon the presumption that marriage, as a legal relationship, may exist only between one man and one woman” (Singer v. Hara). The court concludes with a quotation from another court case saying, “The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman…is as old as the book of Genesis…” (Singer v. Hara). Both this biblical reference and the Alabama Supreme Court’s statement of a “mongrel population” reflect ideology based reasoning in enforcing law, and even more importantly reasoning that was later abolished by Supreme Court rulings as unconstitutional.
As manifestations of the use of marriage law to enforce social order, both the interracial marriage and same sex marriage bans are unconstitutional in their manner of discrimination by basis of identity, and with time and public discourse the public perception of justice has evolved to include new identities under the protection of the constitution in ways which recognize the rights of those once subjugated. The Fourteenth Amendment of the constitution was adopted in 1868 in response to issues of former black slaves being denied citizenship following the American Civil War (“Primary Documents in American History”). As such, the Fourteenth Amendment was created to combat the same deprivation of civil rights based on identity characteristics which both the interracial and same-sex marriage bans codified in law. It is thus a natural result of the discriminatory nature of these sets of laws that they have and continue to be called into conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. Both the interracial marriage ban and same-sex marriage ban were asserted to be unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment not only on occasions whereupon the United States acknowledged their unconstitutionality, but also on earlier occasions when assertions of unconstitutionality were denied out of ideological reasoning. In Pace v. Alabama, the plaintiff called directly upon the clause of the 14th Amendment known as the “equal protection laws,” reasoning that the anti-miscegenation laws violated this clause by discriminating against the defendant on basis of his “negro descent” (Pace v. Alabama). However the court denied this by reasoning of “equal application theory,” stating that since the law itself applies as equally to one group as the other, that neither group is given unequal treatment by law. This reasoning disregards whether or not the statute itself contains racial animus, since it is “equally applied” to both the hegemon and subaltern (Loving v. Virginia). Later in Loving v. Virginia 1967, the 14th Amendment was again cited by a people adversely affected by anti-miscegenation laws in the same manner that it was in Pace v. Alabama (Loving v. Virginia). Similarly to Alabama, Virginia asserted equal application theory as indication of constitutionality under the 14th Amendment. However, on this occasion the Supreme Court rejected ‘the notion that the mere “equal application” of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove [it] from the 14th Amendment’s proscriptions…’ (Loving v. Virginia). In following with the progression of public discourse surrounding anti-miscegenation laws between 1893 and 1967, the government recognized that the laws were “obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.” (Loving v. Virginia). The analogous “doctrine” of the Loving v. Virginia case in same-sex marriage laws is that of the proper form of marriage as between opposite sexes as it is put forth in Singer v. Hara. Singer and Barwick also cited the 14th Amendment’s equal protection laws, but were rejected by the court with a statement of equal application and the ideologically and religiously based definition of marriage as between opposite sexes. However just as the public discourse surrounding anti-miscegenation has progressed, so has the public discourse surrounding the issue of same-sex marriage.
In 1988, polls ranked public opposition of same-sex marriage at upwards of 70 per cent, whereas support of same-sex marriage was ranked at little over 10 per cent. However, the support behind same-sex marriage has since grown at a rate of 1-1.5 points per year while opposition of same-sex marriage has simultaneously decreased (Silver). On Aug. 11, 2010, CNN released the results of the first national poll to show that support for same-sex marriage had become the majority-opinion (“Gay Marriage”). It is thus not surprising that in the three years since, the Supreme Court ruled the interpretation of marriage as between opposite sexes as unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in United States v. Windsor (United States v. Windsor). Just the same as Loving v. Virginia overruled the doctrine of White Supremacy in application of law, United States v. Windsor has done the same of the doctrine of the doctrine behind the opposite-sex marriage ban. The only difference is that the progress of public discourse surrounding same-sex marriage has taken place at a later time than the public discourse of anti-miscegenation laws and racism.
There are multiple reasons put forth by proponents of anti-gay marriage laws for prohibiting same-sex couples from being married. However, the points of contention around marriage for which it is said to be incompatible with members of the same sex are purely ideological, much the same as the White Supremacy doctrine which drove anti-miscegenation laws. These ideologically based laws rob individuals of universal human rights by linking these rights inextricably with identity, and then attempting to impose the officially sanctioned identity upon them via the power endowed by law and government. Thus, both the same-sex and interracial marriage bans were manifestations of oppression codified into law, and were unconstitutional as ideology-driven legislation that did not further “justice.” While “justice” may seem an arbitrary human judgment, it continues to evolve and be given definition and form through public discourse and the ever-changing application of law.
Works Cited
Bieghle, Nadine. “The Salience of My Gender with Respect to My Sex (1634).” CSP6 LGBT Rights in the Internet Era. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Dec. 2013. <https://csp6.wordpress.com/2013/12/02/final-paper-6/>.
“Gay Marriage.” ProCon.org. ProCon.org, n.d. Web. 30 Nov. 2013. <http://gaymarriage.procon.org/>.
“Getting Married: An Overview.” NOLO: Law for All. N.p., n.d. Web. 03 Dec. 2013. <http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/getting-married-overview-29966.html>.
Kennedy, Randall. Interracial Intimacies: Sex, Marriage, Identity, and Adoption. First Vintage Books Edition. First Vintage Books, 2003. Print.
Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1. N. p., 1967.
Newman, David. Sociology. SAGE Publications, Inc, 2010. Print.
Pace v. Alabama 106 U.S. 583. N. p., 1883.
“Primary Documents in American History.” 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Primary Documents of American History (Virtual Programs & Services, Library of Congress). N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Nov. 2013.
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/14thamendment.html>.
Silver, Nate. “Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage Appears to Shift at Accelerated Pace.” FiveThirtyEight.
Singer V. Hara 522 P.2d 1187. N. p., 1974. Print.
United States v. Windsor 580 U.S. _____. N. p., 2013.
By Logan Justice